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INTERNALITY, TRANSFER, AND INFINITESIMAL
MODELING OF INFINITE PROCESSES
EMANUELE BOTTAZZI AND MIKHAIL G. KATZ
Abstract. A probability model is underdetermined when there
is no rational reason to assign a particular infinitesimal value as
the probability of single events. Pruss claims that hyperreal prob-
abilities are underdetermined. The claim is based upon exter-
nal hyperreal-valued measures. We show that internal hyperfinite
measures are not underdetermined. The importance of internality
stems from the fact that Robinson’s transfer principle only applies
to internal entities. We also evaluate the claim that transferless
ordered fields (surreals, Levi-Civita field, Laurent series) may have
advantages over hyperreals in probabilistic modeling. We show
that probabilities developed over such fields are less expressive than
hyperreal probabilities.
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1. Introduction
Alexander Pruss (AP) claims in [28] that hyperreal probabilities are
underdetermined, meaning that, given a model, there is no rational
reason to assign a particular infinitesimal value as the probability of a
single event. AP’s underdetermination claim hinges upon the following:
(1) examples of uniform processes that allegedly do not allow for a
uniquely defined infinitesimal probability for singletons, and
(2) a pair of theorems asserting that for every hyperreal-valued
probability measure there exist uncountably many others that
induce the same decision-theoretic preferences.
In [12] we presented our main arguments highlighting some hidden
biases in the representation of some infinite processes such as lotteries,
coin tosses, and other infinite processes.
In Section 2 we analyze some Archimedean and non-Archimedean
models of Prussian spinners (rotating pointers). In particular, we will
show that hyperfinite models of the spinners are not underdetermined.
Moreover, we will discuss additional constraints that may narrow down
the choice of infinitesimal probabilities, as proposed by AP himself in
[28], Section 3.3 as well as 3.5 (“Other putative constraints”).
We show that the additional probabilities introduced in AP’s theo-
rems are all external; see Section 3. Since external functions do not
obey the transfer principle of Robinson’s framework, these additional
measures are inferior to internal ones when it comes to modeling using
hyperreal fields. Thus AP’s external measures are parasitic in the sense
of Clendinnen ([14], 1989),1 and fail to establish underdetermination.
In the light of our analysis, AP’s theorems can be framed as a warning
against the use of external probabilities that do not satisfy the transfer
principle. Thus, among the additional constraints that, in AP’s words,
“may help narrow down the choice of infinitesimal probabilities” ([28,
Section 3.3]), the first choice should be the internal constraint; see
Sections 2.5 and 3.4 as well as [12], Section 3.2. AP speculates that
1See [12], note 2.
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[An] approach in terms of imprecise probabilities, where
a family of hyperreal-valued probability functions is as-
signed as in Sect. 6.1.2 of Benci et al. (2018), may well
be able to escape the underdetermination worries. ([28,
Section 1]; emphasis in the original)
AP’s wording implies that a single hyperreal-valued probability is un-
able to escape such ‘worries.’ However, we show that a single, internal
hyperreal-valued probability does escape Prussian worries.
AP also speculated that other non-Archimedean fields may bestow
advantages as compared to Robinson’s framework. In Section 4 we
argue that, contrary to AP’s speculation, infinitesimal probabilities in
other familiar non-Archimedean extensions of the real numbers are less
expressive than real-valued probabilities. This is due to the absence of
a uniform way of extending most real functions to these fields so as to
preserve their elementary properties, and to the limitations of the mea-
sure theory currently developed for these fields. From the viewpoint of
Robinson’s framework, such limitations are due to the unavailability of
a transfer principle for these fields.
2. Archimedean and otherwise models of Pruss spinners
We analyze AP’s non-Archimedean models of the spinners, and show
how hyperfinite non-Archimedean models avoid the claimed underde-
termination problem. Starting from some of these hyperfinite models,
it is also possible to define an infinitesimal probability with a stan-
dard sample space and taking values in a field of hyperreals ∗R, thus
addressing AP’s original model (see Section 2.5). In this section we ex-
amine one particular example of the failure of AP’s underdetermination
charge for hyperreal probabilities. Our rebuttal of his claim that every
non-Archimedean probability is underdetermined appears in Section 3.
AP provides the following example (see [28, Section 3]) of a pair of
uniform processes with a common sample space:
(1) the first process is a spinner that is designed to stop uniformly
at an angle θ ∈ [0, 360);
(2) the second process is a spinner that is designed to stop uniformly
at an angle θ ∈ [0, 360), but once it stops, the angle obtained
is doubled.
AP then shows that the outcome of both spinners can be represented
by a uniform probability over the real interval [0, 360). Having intro-
duced this Archimedean model, AP alleges that the description of the
spinners by means of a hyperreal-valued probability depends upon the
underlying mechanism governing each spinner. He concludes that
4 EMANUELE BOTTAZZI AND MIKHAIL G. KATZ
we cannot simply specify an infinitesimal [probability]
by saying that it is whatever is the probability of a uni-
form process hitting a particular point. For what that
probability is – assuming it is infinitesimal and not zero
– depends on details of the process that go beyond uni-
formity. [28, Section 3.2]
To refute AP’s claim, we will show that his conclusion is only due
to inappropriate choices he makes in the non-Archimedean description
of the uniform process, and that indeed appropriate non-Archimedean
models do not depend upon irrelevant details.
We observe that AP appears to extrapolate to every non-Archime-
dean model some properties of the continuous model obtained from the
Lebesgue measure. For instance, he assumes that in every infinitesimal
description of the spinners, the sample space S must have the property
that if x ∈ S, then also x
2
∈ S. This property is satisfied if S is an
interval of Q or of R, but the spinners can also be described by means
of a hyperfinite set SH that is discrete in an appropriate sense.
2 The
representations of the uniform processes by means of a hyperfinite sam-
ple space SH enable us to specify a unique uniform probability measure
over SH that is also regular (see also Section 2.3). Thus for such hyper-
real probabilities no underdetermination occurs. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3
we argue that this result applies also to non-Archimedean probabilities
that satisfy the Ω-limit axioms of Benci et al., since these probabilities
can be obtained as the restriction of suitable hyperfinite measures.
Consequently, in his intuitive arguments for his underdetermination
claim AP relies on additional hypotheses on the non-Archimedean mod-
els that are not satisfied by many relevant hyperreal probabilities.
In Archimedean mathematics, the two spinners discussed by AP can
be described by a family of discrete models and by a continuous model,
as we explain in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 we
show how internal hyperfinite models of AP’s spinners avoid the al-
leged drawbacks. Finally, in Section 2.5, we show how properly defined
hyperfinite measures can approximate to varying degrees other proper-
ties of the models based upon the Cantor–Dedekind representation of
the continuum.
2We have already argued that a given physical process can be given distinct mathe-
matical representations; see [12], Section 2.3. Thus we reject the claim that chang-
ing the sample space, as we have proposed here, changes also the underlying process.
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2.1. Discrete models of the spinners. The discrete models for the
first spinner can be obtained as follows. Let n ∈ N and define
Sn =
{
0, . . . , kpi
n
, . . . , (2n−1)pi
n
}
⊆ [0, 2pi).
One can imagine the set Sn as representing the points on the circle
obtained from rotations by integer multiples of the angle pi
n
. A uniform
probability over Sn is given by Pn(A) =
|A|
|Sn|
= |A|
2n
. The probability
measure Pn has the following four properties:
Tot Pn is total, in the sense that it is defined on the powerset P(Sn)
of the sample space Sn;
Unn Pn is uniform in the sense that for every A,B ⊆ Sn with |A| =
|B|, one has also Pn(A) = Pn(B);
Reg Pn is regular;
3
¬SyR Pn is not symmetric with respect to rotations by an arbitrary
real angle, since if θ ∈ R in general kpi
n
+ θ mod 2pi 6∈ Sn.
In addition, as a consequence of property Unn, the measure Pn satisfies
the following discrete symmetry condition:
Syn Pn symmetric with respect to rotations by multiples of
pi
n
, i.e.
if 0 ≤ θ ≤ 2n− 1 is an integer, then
P
({
k1pi
n
, . . . ,
kjpi
n
})
= P
({
k1pi
n
+ θ pi
n
mod 2pi, . . . ,
kjpi
n
+ θ pi
n
mod 2pi
})
.
The discrete models Qn for the second spinner can be obtained from
the measure P2n as follows:
Qn({x}) = P2n({
x
2
}) + P2n({
x
2
+ pi}) = 2 1
4n
= 1
2n
= Pn({x})
for all x ∈ Sn. From the previous equation it is readily seen that Qn
agrees with Pn over Sn, even though it is obtained from another descrip-
tion of the uniform process. As a consequence, Qn has the properties
Unn, Reg, ¬SyR and Syn already discussed for Pn.
As already observed by Bascelli et al. ([2], 2014), with a choice of
some sufficiently large n, the models Pn and Qn might already be suf-
ficient for many practical purposes, since
all physical quantities can be entirely parametrized by
the usual rational numbers alone, due to the intrinsic
limits of our capability to measure physical quantities.
[2, p. 853]
3By regular we mean that the measure Pn assigns probability 0 only to the empty
event. This should not be confused with the notion of regular measure, i.e. of a
measure ν such that ν(A) = sup{ν(F ) : F ⊆ A is compact and measurable} =
inf{ν(G) : G ⊇ A is open and measurable}.
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This position is shared by Herzberg [21, Section 1]. Nevertheless, we
agree with the common mathematical practice that it is more conve-
nient to introduce some level of idealisation for the description of Pn
and of Qn, especially as n becomes very large.
2.2. Spinner models based on the Lebesgue measure. A typical
idealisation is the use of continuous models based upon the real num-
bers. A continuous model for the first spinner possessing the following
property, Un, of uniformity:
Un if two intervals have the same length, then they have the same
probability
is obtained by using the Lebesgue measure µ over the real interval
[0, 2pi). In this model, events are the measurable subsets of [0, 2pi) and
the probability of an event A is defined as Pµ(A) =
µ(A)
µ([0,2pi))
= µ(A)
2pi
.
Notice also that the choice of [0, 2pi) as the sample space is arbi-
trary. One could equally well measure angles with arc degrees in-
stead of radians. In this case, the sample space would be the real
interval [0, 360) and the probability of an event A would be defined
as P360(A) =
µ(A)
µ([0,360))
= µ(A)
360
. Despite the arbitrariness of the choice of
the sample space, one obtains the compatibility conditions
(2.1) P360(A) = Pµ
({
x ∈ [0, 2pi) : 360
2pi
x ∈ A
})
for all measurable sets A ⊆ [0, 360), and
(2.2) Pµ(B) = P360
({
x ∈ [0, 360) : 2pi
360
x ∈ B
})
for all measurable sets B ⊆ [0, 2pi). From now on, we will refer mostly
to the probability measure Pµ, but the discussion remains valid also
for P360. The probability measure Pµ has different properties from its
discrete counterparts Pn. Namely, it has the following three properties:
Un Pµ is uniform;
¬Reg Pµ is not regular;
SyR Pµ is symmetric with respect to rotations by an arbitrary real
angle.4
4Observe that we have not taken a position on whether the continuous models
satisfy Tot or ¬Tot: if one rejects the full Axiom of Choice, then the Lebesgue
measure can be total; see Solovay ([35], 1970). However, by assuming a suffi-
ciently strong choice principle it is possible to prove that there are sets that are not
Lebesgue measurable, so that Pµ would not be total. Recall also that without some
weak form of the Axiom of Choice it is not possible to prove that the Lebesgue
measure is countably additive. For more details, we refer to Fremlin ([20], 2008)
and to Bottazzi et al. ([11], 2019, Section 5).
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Notice also that for all n ∈ N, and for all h < k ≤ 2n, we have
Pµ
([
hpi
n
, kpi
n
))
= Pn
({
hpi
n
, . . . , (k−1)pi
n
})
.
The previous equality can be interpreted as a coherence between Pµ
and Pn over arcs with endpoints in Sn.
Similarly, the second spinner can be modeled by using the Lebesgue
measure. The probability of an event A is
Qµ(A) =
µ({x : 2x mod 2pi ∈ A})
µ([0, 2pi))
=
µ({x/2: x ∈ A})
2pi
+
µ({x/2 + pi : x ∈ A})
2pi
.
Since the Lebesgue measure is translation invariant, we have the equal-
ity
µ({x/2: x ∈ A})
2pi
=
µ({x/2 + pi : x ∈ A})
2pi
,
from which we deduce
Qµ(A) = 2
µ({x/2: x ∈ A})
2pi
= 2Pµ({x/2: x ∈ A}) = Pµ(A).
The discrete models and the continuous model capture different as-
pects of the spinners. The choice of which model to use in specific
circumstances ought to reflect the relevant properties of each situation.
For instance, one should take into account that, as is well known, the
properties Un, Reg and SyR cannot be simultaneously satisfied by
any real-valued measure defined over an infinite set Ω. This imposes
some limitations on the scope of P . For instance, it is not possible to
define from P a conditional probability with respect to every measur-
able event B. This occurs since the common definition of conditional
probability P (A|B) = P (A∩B)
P (B)
requires B to have positive measure.
2.3. Hyperfinite models of the spinners. The continuous model
based upon the Lebesgue measure is not the only possible idealisation
of the two discrete models for the spinners. By using hyperfinite rep-
resentations, it is possible to define models that satisfy Tot and Reg,
and that approximate to varying degrees the properties Un and SyR.
A simple model of the first spinner is obtained by taking as sam-
ple space the set Sn for some infinitely large hypernatural n.
5 The
corresponding probability measure Pn has the properties Tot, Unn,
5Such models exist thanks to the transfer principle of Robinson’s framework. More-
over, transfer ensures that the properties of the finite models discussed in Section 2.1
are shared by the hyperfinite models presented here.
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Reg, ¬SyR, Syn described for the discrete models of the spinner.
6
If n = m! for some infinite hypernatural m, then Syn implies SyQ,
that is symmetry with respect to rotations by any rational angle. As
observed for instance by Benci et al. [3, p. 5], Pn cannot satisfy the
properties Un and SyR; however it has the coherence property
Co Pn(
∗A∩Sn) ≈ Pµ(A) for each measurable A ⊆ [0, 2pi),
7
that implies the weak form of uniformity
Pn([a, b)) ≈ Pn([c, d)) whenever b− a = d− c,
and the weak form of symmetry
Pn(
∗A ∩ Sn) ≈ Pn(
∗{x+ θ mod 2pi : x ∈ A} ∩ Sn)
for every measurable A ⊆ [0, 2pi) and for every real θ ∈ [0, 2pi).
As already discussed in the Archimedean discrete models, the second
spinner can be represented by the hyperfinite probability Qn for an
infinite hypernatural n. This probability measure shares the properties
Tot, Unn, ¬SyR, Syn and Co with the first spinner; moreover one
has Qn({x}) = Pn({x}), as in the Archimedean models.
Recall that the continuous description of the spinners based upon
the real Lebesgue measure could be formulated with different choices
of the sample space (e.g., the interval [0, 2pi) or the interval [0, 360))
but it is independent of such choices in the sense expressed by equa-
tions (2.1) and (2.2). For the hyperfinite measures Pn we have a similar
property, expressed by the following compatibility condition: when-
ever gcd(m,n) = min{m,n} = n, we have
(2.3) Pn(A) = Pm
({
x ∈ Sm :
m
n
x mod 2pi ∈ A
})
for all A ⊆ Sn.
Equality (2.3) is the discrete counterpart of equations (2.1) and
(2.2). The main differences between the continuous equations and
the hyperfinite one is that in the real case there is a bijection be-
tween the sets [0, 2pi) and [0, 360) given by the map x 7→ 360
2pi
x, while
in the discrete case (either finite or hyperfinite) there is no bijection
6Property Tot should be interpreted as follows: Pn is defined on every internal
set A ⊆ Sn. Similarly, property Unn should be interpreted as follows: for every
internal A,B ⊆ Sn with |A| = |B|, one has also Pn(A) = Pn(B). The symbol |A|
denotes the element of ∗N corresponding to the internal cardinality of the internal
set A.
7Here≈ denotes the relation of infinite proximity, i.e., the relation of being infinitely
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between the sets Sn and Sm unless n = m.
8 On the other hand,
if gcd(m,n) = min{m,n} = n, then there is a m
n
-to-one correspon-
dence between Sm and Sn; together with properties Unn and Unm of
the measures Pn and Pm, this is sufficient to entail the relation (2.3).
2.4. Hidden assumptions on infinitesimal models of spinners.
In his Section 3.2, AP seems to suggest that in Robinson’s framework
every pair of probability measures P and Q for the first and the second
spinner, respectively, satisfy the following conditions:
(Pr 1) P and Q have the same sample space;
(Pr 2) P and Q should assign the same probability to singletons;
(Pr 3) Q({x}) = 2P ({x/2}).
From properties (Pr 2) and (Pr 3) AP obtains his underdetermination
claim [28, Section 3.2].
However, as we have seen in the discussion of the discrete models,
if one wishes to retain property (Pr 1) in a hyperfinite setting, the re-
quirement (Pr 3) must be replaced by a subtler condition. In particular,
for the hyperfinite probabilities Pn and Qn defined on Sn we have seen
that Qn should be defined in terms of P2n as follows:
(3′) Qn({x}) = P2n({
x
2
}) + P2n({
x
2
+ pi mod 2pi}) = 2P2n({
x
2
}),
since for some x ∈ Sn the number x/2 does not belong to the sam-
ple space Sn but does belong to S2n. We have already argued that
definition (3′) implies that Qn({x}) is indeed equal to Pn({x}) for ev-
ery x ∈ Sn. This example shows how internal hyperfinite models of the
two spinners are sufficient to refute AP’s claim that the infinitesimal
probability of a pair of uniform processes on the same outcome space
allegedly “depends on details of the process that go beyond uniformity”
[28, Section 3.2].
A similar rebuttal applies to AP’s description of the pair of uniform
lotteries over N in [28, Section 4.1].
2.5. Refining the models by means of additional constraints.
AP notes that
8We remark that there is no internal bijection between Sn and Sm. If one drops the
requirement that the bijection must be internal, then it is possible to find external
bijections witnessing that the external cardinality of Sn is equal to the external
cardinality of Sm whenever both n and m are infinite. However, the existence of
external bijections between Sn and Sm has no bearing our argument, that is instead
based upon the internal cardinality. For a discussion on the limited relevance of
external objects and functions in hyperreal models see Section 3 and note 22, as
well as [12], Sections 3.2 and 3.4.
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[T]here are potential types of constraints on the choice
of infinitesimals that may help narrow down the choice
of infinitesimal probabilities. One obvious constraint is
formal: the axioms of finitely additive probability. A
second type of constraint is match between the extended
real probabilities for a problem and the corresponding
classical real-valued probabilities. ([28, Section 3.3]; em-
phasis added)
Thus, AP envisions the possibility of introducing additional constraints
that may narrow down the choice of infinitesimal probabilities. He even
evokes more specifically the possibility of exploring a “match” between
extended-real probabilities and classical real-valued probabilities. To
practitioners of mathematics in Robinson’s framework it would be nat-
ural to interpret such a “match” in terms of the constraint of being
internal.9 By envisioning the possibility of introducing further con-
straints, AP opens the door to introducing the internal condition. The
internal condition would in any case be the obvious first choice for a
practitioner of mathematics in Robinson’s framework. It is a constraint
that AP failed to consider. Similar shortcomings of Elga’s analysis in
([17], 2004) were signaled by Herzberg ([21], 2007).
In addition, it is possible to introduce further constraints. As an ex-
ample, we propose two different hyperfinite representations of the uni-
form spinners. Hyperfinite entities, being internal, satisfy the transfer
principle. Moreover, each of the following hyperfinite models will have
various properties that improve upon Tot, Unn, Reg, ¬SyR and Co
of the measure Pn.
The main result of Benci et al. [3] entails that there exists
• an algebra of Lebesgue measurable sets B ⊆ P([0, 2pi)) such
that for every A ∈ B, either A = ∅ or Pµ(A) 6= 0;
10
• a hyperfinite set Ω ⊆ ∗[0, 2pi) such that for every x ∈ [0, 2pi), ∗x ∈
Ω;
• a hyperfinite probability measure PΩ over Ω
with the properties Tot, Un|Ω|, Reg, ¬SyR, Co and the following
additional property:
UnB PΩ is uniform over sets of B, i.e., PΩ(
∗A ∩ Ω) = PΩ(
∗B ∩ Ω)
whenever A,B ∈ B and Pµ(A) = Pµ(B).
9Internal sets are elements of (∗-extensions of) classical sets; see [12], Section 3.1.
Robinson’s book ([29], 1966) deals with internal entities systematically.
10An interesting and nontrivial choice is the ring of finite unions of intervals of the
form [a, b). For more details, see Benci et al. ([4], 2015, p. 43).
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As a consequence of Un|Ω|, PΩ satisfies Unn for all n ∈ N. Moreover,
the property UnB implies that PΩ is symmetric with respect to rota-
tions by an arbitrary real angle, but only on the nonstandard extensions
of sets in B. For more details, we refer to [3] and [4, Section 3], where
the example of the Lebesgue measure is discussed in detail.
The hyperfinite measure PΩ can also be used to define a non-Archi-
medean probability over the sample space [0, 2pi) by setting
(2.4) P (A) = PΩ(
∗A ∩ Ω) for each A ⊆ [0, 2pi).
The hypothesis that for every x ∈ [0, 2pi), ∗x ∈ Ω ensures that PΩ(x) =
1
|Ω|
for every x ∈ [0, 2pi). Thus the measure P of (2.4) is regular and
uniform in the sense that it assigns the same nonzero probability to
singletons.
In Section 3.2 we argue that non-Archimedean probabilities that
satisfy the Omega-limit axiom of Benci et al. can be obtained in a
similar way, i.e., by restricting a suitable hyperfinite probability. In
this external measure over [0, 2pi), the choice for the probability of a
singleton is uniquely determined from the underlying hyperfinite set Ω,
and it is not arbitrary as argued by AP.
By using an earlier result by Wattenberg [36], it is possible to obtain
another hyperfinite set ΩH and a hyperfinite probability measure PH
over ΩH that has an additional advantage. Namely, it is coherent
not only with the Lebesgue measure, but also with the Hausdorff t-
measures.
Recall that the Hausdorff outer measure of order t of a set A ⊆ R is
defined as
H
t
(A) = lim
δ→0
{∑
n∈N
λ(In)
t : A ⊆
⋃
n∈N
In, λ(In) < δ
}
.
The Hausdorff measure H t is the restriction of the outer measure H
t
to the σ-algebra of measurable subsets of Ω.
The probability measure PH over ΩH has the properties Tot,Un|ΩH |,
Reg, ¬SyR as well as the following property:
CoH if B is a Borel set with finite nonzero Hausdorff t-measure for
some real t ∈ [0,+∞), then for every H t-measurable set A ⊆
ΩH the sets AH =
∗A ∩ ΩH and BH =
∗B ∩ ΩH satisfy the
relations
H t(A ∩ B)
H t(B)
≈
PH(AH ∩ BH)
PH(BH)
= PH(AH |BH).
Notice that, by taking t = 1 and B = [0, 2pi), CoH implies Co.
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Each of the probability measures Pn, PΩ and PH described above
models different aspects of the spinner. In particular, they are all uni-
form, regular and total probability measures; moreover they approx-
imate to varying degrees the properties of the real continuous model
based upon the Lebesgue measure or upon the Hausdorff measure.
Furthermore, the probability PΩ shows how the critique that non-
Archimedean probabilities do not preserve intuitive symmetries, pre-
sented by AP in [28, Section 3.3], can be addressed by means of a
suitable hyperfinite model.
Meanwhile, the probability PH shows that hyperreal-valued probabil-
ity measures can be used simultaneously to represent the uncountably
many Hausdorff t-measures. The strength of these kinds of hyperfinite
models is not discussed by AP, who only considers the coherence of a
non-Archimedean measure with a single real-valued measure.
3. Are infinitesimal probabilities underdetermined?
In Section 2 we presented an analysis of AP’s non-Archimedean mod-
eling. Now we turn to his underdetermination theorems. AP’s first
theorem is based upon the following construction. Let P be a prob-
ability function with values in a non-Archimedean ordered extension
of R. AP sets
(3.1) Pα(A) = St(P (A)) + α(P (A)− St(P (A)))
for every α > 0.11 AP’s first theorem expresses the fact that Pα is
infinitely close to P and satisfies the same inequalities as P does. This
result can be interpreted as the fact that the probabilities P and Pα
induce the same comparisons between events.
AP’s second theorem asserts a similar result for probability measures
that satisfy the Ω-limit axiom of Benci et al. In this case, starting from
a probability that satisfies the Ω-limit axiom (see Section 3.2) and from
an automorphism φ of ∗R that fixes only the standard real numbers, it
is possible to define a new probability
(3.2) Pφ = φ ◦ P
that yields the same comparisons between events as P , and that still
satisfies the Ω-limit axiom.
Both results are technically correct, but what AP fails to mention is
that, if P is internal, then the additional probabilities Pα and Pφ are all
external whenever they differ from P , as we show in Sections 3.1 and
11AP assumes in addition that α ∈ R. However his results are still valid for every
positive finite α ∈ ∗R.
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3.3. Thus, they are badly behaved and do not satisfy the transfer prin-
ciple of Robinson’s framework (see [12], Section 3.2) and are therefore
parasitic in the sense of Clendinnen [14].12
The significance of transfer and related principles both in the cur-
rent practice of non-Archimedean mathematics based upon Robinson’s
framework (see [12], Sections 3.1 and 3.2) and in the historical develop-
ment of mathematical theories with infinitesimals (see [12], Section 3.3)
is sufficient reason to recast AP’s theorems as a warning against the use
of external probabilities in hyperreal modeling. Thus a careful analysis
of Prussian theorems enables a meaningful criterion for the rejection of
AP’s underdetermination charge.
For the purposes of the discussion that follows, recall that the trans-
fer principle entails that any internal probability measure on a hyperfi-
nite sample space Ω is hyperfinitely additive, i.e., that for every internal
A ⊆ Ω, one has P (A) =
∑
ω∈A P ({ω}). Consequently, if a probability
measure is not hyperfinitely additive, then it is not internal.
3.1. The first theorem of Pruss. We begin our analysis with AP’s
first theorem. AP is not clear on the domain of P ; here we will assume
that P is an internal probability measure defined over a hyperfinite
set Ω and that P ({ω}) ≈ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. This hypothesis is not
restrictive, since these measures are general enough to represent every
non-atomic13 real-valued probability measure [3, Theorem 2.2, p. 6].
We define Pα as in (3.1). Then the following theorem holds.
Theorem 1. Let Ω be a hyperfinite set and let P : ∗P(Ω) → ∗R be an
internal probability measure that satisfies P ({ω}) ≈ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
If α 6= 1 then Pα is external.
The significance of such externality can be appreciated in light of
the following fact. If {Xi : i < H} is an internal sequence of sets of
infinite hyperfinite length H , and P an internal measure, then the sum∑
i P (Xi) is well defined in
∗R; but if P is not internal then generally
speaking
∑
i P (Xi) cannot be reasonably defined at all.
Proof of Theorem 1. Since P is internal, it is hyperfinitely additive. As
a consequence,∑
ω∈Ω
Pα({ω}) =
∑
ω∈Ω
αP ({ω}) = α
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω}) = α.
12See note 1.
13A real-valued probability function is called non-atomic if and only if it assigns
measure 0 to every singleton. If a real-valued probability measure P can be decom-
posed into a sum of a non-atomic measure Pna and a discrete measure Pd, then our
Theorem 1 can still be applied to the hyperfinite representatives of Pna.
14 EMANUELE BOTTAZZI AND MIKHAIL G. KATZ
Since Pα(Ω) = 1, the probability Pα is hyperfinitely additive if and
only if α = 1, so that if α 6= 1 then Pα cannot be hyperfinitely additive
and, as a consequence, it is external. 
3.2. The Ω-limit axiom. A similar argument refutes AP’s interpre-
tation of his second theorem; see Section 3.3. Before showing that the
probability measures Pφ obtained by AP are external, it will be con-
venient to recall the Ω-limit axiom of Benci et al. [5] and some of its
consequences. In this subsection, Ω will be a set of classical mathemat-
ics. Define also Λ = {A ⊆ Ω: |A| ∈ N}. Thus if λ ∈ Λ, then λ is a
finite set.
The Ω-limit is a notion of limit governed by the following definition.
Definition 1. Let Ω be an infinite set and F an ordered field F ⊃ R.
An Ω-limit in F is a correspondence that associates to every func-
tion f : Λ → R, an element of F , denoted by limλ↑Ω f , in such a way
that the following properties hold:
(1) if there is a λ ∈ Λ with f(λ) = c ∈ R for every λ ⊇ λ,
then limλ↑Ω f(λ) = c;
(2) for every f, g : Λ→ R, one has
• limλ↑Ω(f(λ) + g(λ)) = limλ↑Ω f(λ) + limλ↑Ω g(λ), and
• limλ↑Ω(f(λ) · g(λ)) = limλ↑Ω f(λ) · limλ↑Ω g(λ).
It is possible to obtain an Ω-limit by a suitable ultrapower construc-
tion. If one defines F = RΛ/U , where U is a fine and free ultrafilter
over Λ,14 then F is a field of hyperreal numbers. An Ω-limit over F
can then be obtained by setting limλ↑Ω f(λ) = [f ]U .
A probability function P : P(Ω) → ∗R satisfies the Ω-limit axiom if
and only if there exists an Ω-limit such that P (A) = limλ↑Ω P (A|λ) for
every A ⊆ Ω.
Using the Ω-limit axiom it is possible to define a notion of infinite
sum for P . Thus, for every A ⊆ Ω, the sum
∑
ω∈A P (ω) is defined
as limλ↑Ω
(∑
ω∈A∩λ P (ω)
)
; see also [6, p. 6].
Since a probability that satisfies the Ω-limit axiom is defined over a
classical set Ω, the non-Archimedean probabilities that satisfy the Ω-
limit axiom are external [6, p. 25]. However, this is only due to the
choice by Benci et al. of working with a sample space that is not inter-
nal. In fact, we will now show that non-Archimedean probabilities that
14An ultrafilter U over Λ is fine whenever for every λ ∈ Λ = {A ⊆ Ω: |A| ∈ N}, one
has {L ⊆ Λ: λ ∈ L} ∈ U . Such ultrafilters were referred to as adequate in earlier
literature; see e.g., Kanovei–Reeken [23, p. 143]. A free ultrafilter is an ultrafilter
that does not have a ⊆-least element.
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satisfy the Ω-limit axiom can be obtained as the restriction of suitable
internal hyperfinite probabilities. Let Ω ⊆ R.15 We define the set
(3.3) ΩΛ =
{
lim
λ↑Ω
f(λ) : Λ
f
→ R and f(λ) ∈ λ
}
.
Then ΩΛ is an internal hyperfinite set that represents Ω. Moreover, it
is possible to define an internal, uniform probability measure
(3.4) P : ∗P(ΩΛ)→
∗R
by setting P (A) = |A|
|ΩΛ|
for every internal A ⊆ ΩΛ. With this definition,
one has
P (A) = P (∗A ∩ ΩΛ) =
|∗A ∩ ΩΛ|
|ΩΛ|
for every A ⊆ Ω. A proof of these statements can be obtained from
the proof of Theorem 2.2 in [3] as well as [6, Section 3.6]. Observe also
that, if φ is an automorphism of ∗R, then Pφ(A) = φ
(
P (∗A ∩ ΩΛ)
)
.
3.3. The second theorem of Pruss. As we showed in Section 3.2,
non-Archimedean probabilities that satisfy the Ω-limit are restrictions
of hyperfinite internal measures. We can now state our result con-
cerning AP’s probabilities Pφ. First, recall that in [28, Section 3.6,
Proposition 1] AP proves that there are uncountably many nontrivial
automorphisms of ∗R that fix R. However, these automorphisms are
all external.
Proposition 1. If φ : ∗R→ ∗R is a field automorphism, then either φ
is the identity or φ is external.
Proof. It is well known that the only field automorphism of R is the
identity. Thus, by transfer, the only internal field automorphism of ∗R
is the identity. 
Our Proposition 1 already suggests that probability measures Pφ are
external whenever they do not coincide with P . However, we will prove
such a result explicitly, establishing our counterpart to AP’s second
theorem.
Theorem 2. Let P : P(Ω) → ∗R be a probability measure that satisfies
the Ω-limit axiom and let ΩΛ and P be defined as in (3.3) and (3.4).
Suppose also that φ : ∗R→ ∗R is a field automorphism. Then the mea-
sure P φ = φ ◦ P is internal if and only if the restriction of φ to the
range of P is the identity.
15This hypothesis can be avoided by extending the notion of Ω-limit as shown by
Bottazzi [8, Sections 4.2 and 4.3].
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Proof. Recall that the range of the measure P is the hyperfinite set S ={
0, 1
n
, 2
n
, . . . , k
n
, . . . , 1
}
, where n = |ΩΛ|. Let ψ be the restriction of φ
to the range of P . If ψ is the identity, then P φ = P .
Suppose ψ is an internal automorphism different from the iden-
tity. Then the set
{
0, 1
ψ(n)
, 2
ψ(n)
, . . . , ψ(k)
ψ(n)
, . . . , 1
}
is internal. Multi-
plying every element of this set by ψ(n), we would obtain that the
set {0, 1, 2, . . . , ψ(k), . . . , ψ(n)} is internal, as well. Let k be the least
number such that ψ(k) 6= k. Then ψ(k − 1) = k − 1, so ψ(k) =
ψ(k − 1 + 1) = ψ(k − 1) + ψ(1) = k − 1 + 1 = k, a contradiction.
Thus ψ is necessarily external (or the identity). It remains to show
that ψ ◦ P is external. Since P is an internal mapping of the hyper-
finite set ∗P(ΩΛ) onto S =
{
0, 1
n
, 2
n
, . . . , 1
}
, it has an internal right
inverse χ : S → ∗P(ΩΛ) such that P ◦ χ is the identity on S. If ψ ◦ P
were internal, then ψ ◦ P ◦ χ = ψ would be internal, contrary to our
hypothesis. 
3.4. Internal probability measures are not underdetermined.
Our Theorems 1 and 2 indicate that the underdetermination issue
raised by AP is present only whenever one considers external prob-
ability measures in addition to the internal ones. Significantly, such
external probability measures do not exist in Nelson’s Internal Set
Theory (see [12], Section 3.2). Notice also that working with inter-
nal probability measures is not restrictive, since, as we have shown,
non-Archimedean functions that satisfy the Ω-limit can be obtained as
the restriction of suitable internal hyperfinite probabilities.
It should be noted that we are not claiming that external mea-
sures are not useful for hyperreal models. In fact, the external non-
Archimedean probabilities by Benci et al. and the Loeb measures, that
are obtained from suitable internal measures, play a relevant role for
the development of infinitesimal probabilities and for the hyperreal
measure theory, respectively.16 What we showed is that the external
probabilities proposed by AP do not have even basic properties such as
hyperfinite additivity. As a consequence, these external probabilities
are clearly inferior to their internal counterparts.
In conclusion, once a hyperfinite sample space Ω is determined, there
is only one internal, uniform and regular probability measure P over Ω.
16Recall that the Loeb measure of an internal measure µ is obtained by compos-
ing µ with the (external) standard part function. By the Caratheodory extension
theorem, the resulting pre-measure is then extended to a measure defined on an
external σ-algebra, that is usually called the Loeb measure associated to µ.
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As a consequence, internal uniform probability measures with hyperfi-
nite support are not underdetermined, contrary to what was alleged by
Pruss.17
Indeed, Pruss’ pair of theorems can be interpreted as a warning
against the use of external measures in hyperreal probabilities. As
already noted in Section 2.5, Pruss envisions the possibility of introduc-
ing additional constraints. The discussion above suggests that the very
first constraint one should envision is the natural (and even obvious,
to a practitioner of mathematics in Robinson’s framework) constraint
of being internal.
In an analysis of the phenomenon of underdetermination, Clendinnen
speaks of “empirically equivalent alternatives [that are] parasitic on
[the original] theory” [14, p. 63], an apt description of Pruss’ external
measures of the form (3.1) and (3.2).
4. Probability measures on transferless fields
Pruss claims that some extensions of the real numbers with infinites-
imals, such as the surreal numbers, the fields of Laurent series or the
Levi-Civita field, might provide a non-arbitrary choice of infinitesimals
for the development of non-Archimedean probabilities.
Due to the absence of a transfer principle, already discussed in [12,
Section 3.4], there are some obstacles to developing a probability theory
over these non-Archimedean extensions of the real numbers. We will
discuss two examples in detail in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
4.1. Probability measures on the surreal numbers. Pruss sug-
gests that Conway’s surreal numbers (usually denoted No) might be
suitable for the development of infinitesimal probabilities, since
Whatever you can do with hyperreals, you can do with
surreals, since any field of hyperreals can be embedded
in the surreals. [28, Section 2]
Pruss seeks support for such a claim in Ehrlich [16]. In fact, the result
[16, Theorem 20] entails that in the von Neumann–Bernays–Go¨del set
theory with global choice, there exists a unique (up to an isomorphism)
structure (R,R∗, ∗) such that R∗ satisfies Keisler’s axioms for hyperreal
number systems and R∗ is a proper class isomorphic to the class of
surreal numbers.
17This argument and the possibility of uniquely specifying a hyperreal field, as
discussed in Section 2.1 of [12], refute Pruss’ claim that hyperreal probabilities are
underdetermined both in the choice of a specific hyperreal field and in the choice
of the infinitesimal probability of singletons.
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Ehrlich observes, furthermore, that every field of hyperreal numbers
is isomorphic to an initial segment of the surreal numbers:
Since every real-closed ordered field is isomorphic to an
initial subfield of No, the underlying ordered field of
any hyperreal number system is likewise isomorphic to
an initial subfield of No.18 For example, the familiar
ultrapower construction of a hyperreal number system
as a quotient ring of RN (modulo a given nonprincipal
ultrafilter on N) is isomorphic to No(ω1) . . . assuming
[the continuum hypothesis] . . . Similarly, if we assume
there is an uncountable inaccessible cardinal, ωα being
the least, then No(ωα) . . . is isomorphic to the un-
derlying ordered field in the hyperreal number system
employed by Keisler in his Foundations of Infinitesimal
Analysis. [16, Section 9, p. 35]
Indeed, it is only the isomorphisms mentioned by Ehrlich that en-
dow the surreal numbers (or their initial segments) with the transfer
principle of Robinson’s framework.19 In addition, the ∗-map allows
for the extension of functions in a way that the simplicity hierarchical
structure of the surreal numbers is not yet able to handle [7].
If one refrains from exploiting the transfer principle of Robinson’s
framework, then the current developments of analysis over the surreal
field are fairly limited. For instance, it is still an open problem to
define an integral over No, despite some limited results obtained in
the last two decades (Costin et al. [15], 2015; Fornasiero [19], 2004).
As a consequence, it is not currently possible to develop a measure
theory, let alone a probability theory, over the surreal numbers.
4.2. Probability measures on the Levi-Civita field. At the other
end of the spectrum, Pruss advocates the use of the “elegantly small”
Levi-Civita field R. This extension of the real numbers was introduced
by Levi-Civita in [24, 25]. It is the smallest non-Archimedean ordered
field extension of the field R of real numbers that is both real closed
and complete in the order topology.20 For an introduction, we refer to
Lightstone–Robinson [26] and to Berz–Shamseddine [34].
18It should be noted that the property of being an ordered field is a small fraction
of the properties of the reals required to develop any substantial calculus. The
surreals lack many relevant properties even with regard to their collection of natural
numbers; see [12], note 28.
19As well as with the natural numbers and all the associated structure over 〈R;N〉
necessary to develop calculus and measure theory.
20As opposed to other forms of completeness.
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The Levi-Civita field is defined as the set
R =
{
x ∈ RQ : ∀q ∈ Q supp(x) ∩ (−∞, q] is finite
}
together with the pointwise sum, and the product defined by the for-
mula
(4.1) (x · y)(q) =
∑
q1+q2=q
x(q1) · y(q2).
If one defines the element d ∈ R by posing
d(q) =
{
1 if q = 1
0 if q 6= 1,
then every number inR can be written as a formal sum x =
∑
q∈Q aqd
q.
In this sum the set Q(x) = {q ∈ Q : aq 6= 0} has the property that the
intersection Q(x) ∩ (−∞, q] is finite for every q ∈ Q.21 Elements of R
can be identified with those elements in R whose support is a subset
of the singleton {0}. The field R can be linearly ordered22 and is
sequentially complete in the order topology, but due to the presence
of infinitesimal elements it is totally disconnected23 (the topological
properties of R are discussed in detail by Shamseddine [31]).
If one considers the language L of ordered fields,24 then the real
numbers R, fields of hyperreal numbers and the Levi-Civita field R
21Pruss incorrectly states that only finitely many of the aq are nonzero [28, Sec-
tion 2].
22It is customary to define the order on R in a way that the number d is an
infinitesimal.
23This property is shared by every non-Archimedean extension of R. However,
fields of hyperreal numbers of Robinson’s framework overcome this limitation by
working with internal sets and functions. For instance, in both the Levi-Civita field
and in ∗R the series
∑
n∈N
r is not defined unless r = 0, but a sum of hyperfinitely
many copies of r ∈ ∗R is well-defined. Similarly, in the Levi-Civita field one should
take into account that the function f defined by
f(x) =
{
1 if x ≈ 0
0 if x 6≈ 0
is differentiable at every point in R, but it does not satisfy e.g. the Intermediate
Value Theorem or the Mean Value Theorem. Meanwhile, the counterpart of this
function in Robinson’s framework is external, so it does not provide a counterex-
ample to the Intermediate Value Theorem or to the Mean Value Theorem.
24Namely L = {+,−, 0, ·,−1, 1, <}, where + and · are binary functions, − and −1
are unary functions, 0 and 1 are constant symbols, and < is a binary relation.
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are L-structures which are models of the model-complete25 L-theory
of real closed ordered fields [13, 27]. However, the Levi-Civita field is
not elementarily equivalent to R, and the only result analogous to the
transfer principle between R and R is fairly limited. In particular, only
locally analytic functions can be extended from real closed intervals to
closed intervals in R in a way that preserves elementary properties [9,
Sections 3, 4].
Consider now the uniform measurem on the Levi-Civita field studied
by Berz–Shamseddine ([33], 2003), Shamseddine ([32], 2012), and Bot-
tazzi ([10], 2020). A set is measurable with respect tom if it can be ap-
proximated arbitrarily well by intervals, in analogy with the Lebesgue
measure. However, due to the properties of the topology of the Levi-
Civita field, the measure m turns out to be rather different from the
Lebesgue measure over R. For instance, in R the complement of a
measurable set is not necessarily measurable. As a consequence, the
family of measurable sets is not even an algebra.
As with the Lebesgue measure, the family of measurable functions is
obtained from a family of simple functions. For the Lebesgue measure,
these are the step functions; however a similar choice in the Levi-Civita
field would lead to a very narrow class of measurable functions. A more
fruitful choice for the Levi-Civita field is to define the simple functions
as the analytic functions over a closed interval.
Regardless of the choice of simple functions, Shamseddine and Berz
proved that any measurable function on a set A ⊆ R is locally simple
almost everywhere onA [33, Proposition 3.4, p. 379]. As a consequence,
an absolutely continuous probability measure over R can only have a
locally analytic density function; similarly, the only real probability
functions that can be extended to probability functions over the Levi-
Civita field are locally analytic. A partial converse of this negative
result shows that measurable functions are not expressive enough to
approximate with an infinitesimal error a real probability that is not
locally analytic at any point of its domain [10, Proposition 3.16].
We now turn our attention to discrete probability measures defined
over the Levi-Civita field. We note that this field has no notion of
hyperfiniteness or of sum over sets that are not countable. Moreover,
if h ∈ R is an infinitesimal, the limit limn→∞
∑n
i=0 h = limn→∞ nh is
not defined, since the sequence {nh}n∈N does not converge in R. This
is a significant difference with hyperreal-valued measures, where one
25A theory in a language L is model-complete if for every pair M and N of models
of the theory, if there is an embedding i : M →֒ N , then the embedding is elemen-
tary. An embedding is elementary whenever for every first-order formula φ in the
language L, M |= φ(a1, . . . , an) if and only if N |= φ(i(a1), . . . , i(an).
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can sum a internal hyperfinite family of infinitesimal terms and obtain
a well-defined hyperreal result.
As a consequence, whenever Ω ⊆ R is not a finite set, there can-
not be a regular probability measure m over Ω that assigns the same
probability to every ω ∈ Ω. In this regard, R-valued discrete probabil-
ity measures do not offer any improvement upon real-valued discrete
probability measures.
These properties of the uniform measure and of the discrete prob-
ability measures over the Levi-Civita field impose serious limitations
on the use of the Levi-Civita field as the target space of a probability
measure, be it absolutely continuous, discrete, or a combination of the
two.
4.3. Probability measures in other fields with infinitesimals.
The Hahn field, obtained from functions x ∈ RQ with well-ordered
support with the pointwise sum and the product defined as in for-
mula (4.1), shares some properties with the Levi-Civita field. Never-
theless, there is no measure theory over the Hahn field yet, even though
some preliminary results on the convergence of power series were ob-
tained by Flynn and Shamseddine in ([18], 2019).
Kaiser recently developed a uniform measure over a class of non-
Archimedean real closed fields ([22], 2018). However, this measure
is only defined for semialgebraic sets. This condition is even more
restrictive than the one imposed on the measurable sets in the Levi-
Civita field (see Section 4.2). Note also that the resulting measure is
only finitely additive.
The picture that emerges is very different from the one sketched by
Pruss. Robinson’s hyperreal fields have many advantages over other
non-Archimedean extensions of R, as already realized by Fraenkel (see
[12], Section 3.3), and it is unlikely that the gap between these theories
will be closed any time soon.
5. Conclusion
In his Synthese paper [28], Pruss claims that the infinitesimal prob-
abilities of Robinson’s framework for analysis with infinitesimals are
underdetermined. His claim hinges upon
(1) some models of infinitesimal probabilities, and
(2) a pair of theorems that entail the existence of uncountably many
infinitesimal probabilities that yield the same decision-theoretic
comparisons as the original one.
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In Section 2, we addressed issue (1) by showing that proper hyperfinite
models avoid the underdetermination problem. In Section 3 we focused
on Prussian theorems mentioned in item (2), and proved that all of the
additional infinitesimal probabilities obtained by Pruss are external. As
a consequence, once a hyperfinite sample space has been chosen, there is
only one internal probability measure over it. The results of Sections 2
and 3 suggest that the underdetermination critique of Pruss is limited
to external entities.26 Thus, working with internal sets and functions
in Robinson’s framework dissolves the underdetermination objection.
While recognizing that it may be possible to narrow down the choice of
infinitesimal probability using additional constraints, Pruss fails to con-
sider the natural internal constraint. Pruss could respond by arguing
that internality is not the kind of criterion he had in mind; however, the
point remains that internality is such an obvious choice that it should
have been addressed one way or another. The fact that the issue is not
examined in his paper constitutes a serious shortcoming of his analysis.
A would-be critic of Robinson’s framework could then retreat to an
even more limited objection to the effect that the choice of the sample
space is underdetermined. However, in the discussion of the hyperfinite
models we showed the following:
• this choice is underdetermined in the Archimedean case, as well;
however, this underdetermination is not problematic, since dif-
ferent models (be they Archimedean or hyperfinite) are com-
patible, as discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
• it is also possible to specify additional criteria for the choice
of a hyperfinite model: for instance, it is possible to preserve
rotational symmetry on a non-trivial family of sets or coher-
ence with uncountably many real-valued measures, as shown in
Section 2.5. Thus the possibility of working with hyperfinite
models that improve upon the properties of the Archimedean
ones should be regarded as an advantage of hyperreal probabil-
ities.
In his critique, Pruss also suggests that other fields with infinitesimals
are more suitable for the development of infinitesimal probabilities.
However, in [12], Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we showed that this claim ig-
nores the Klein–Fraenkel criteria for the usefulness of a theory with
infinitesimals. In addition, in Section 4 we showed that probabilities
26We remark that, while the probability functions that satisfy the Ω-limit axiom
are external, they are obtained as the restriction of suitable internal hyperfinite
functions, as shown in Section 3.2. Thus they are also impervious to Pruss’ unde-
termination claim.
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taking values in the surreal numbers and in the Levi-Civita field are less
expressive than real-valued probabilities, mainly due to the absence of
a transfer principle for these structures. Moreover, the absence of a
comprehensive transfer principle makes such fields vulnerable to The-
orem 1 of Pruss. In contrast to hyperreal fields, transferless fields do
not possess a notion of internality and are thus unable to escape un-
derdetermination.
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